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This paper explores the relationships between economics and psychology in the 1940s and 1950s by investigating the origin, the content, and the influence on economic analysis of two experiments on individual decision making. Both experiments had the same goal and overall structure: they aimed at measuring the utility of money of a number of individuals on the basis of their preferences between gambles where small amounts of real money were at stake.
Both experiments relied on the theory of choices involving risk that in those years was emerging as the dominant one in economics, namely expected utility theory (EUT), with the utility measures generated by both experiments providing an indirect test of EUT's validity. Although these two experiments do not tell the whole history of the interdisciplinary interaction between economics and psychology in the 1940s and 1950s, they provide a case study that, for a number of reasons, allows us to illuminate a significant part of that interaction. First, the designs of the two experiments exhibit a tension between the economic image of human agency associated with EUT, and insights from experimental psychology research carried on since the 1920s. For instance, EUT assumes that individuals' preferences over gambles are fixed and do not fluctuate: if an individual states that he prefers gamble A to gamble B, he won't reverse his preference if asked to compare the two gambles again.
However, experimental psychologists such as Louis Leon Thurstone (1927) had called attention to the fact that, because of judgment errors, distraction, or variation in sensibility, individuals' comparative judgments do fluctuate. Mosteller and Nogee incorporated Thurstone's psychological insight into the design of their experiment. Or, to take another example, EUT assumes that individuals do not distort objective probabilities and therefore evaluate the event "heads" in tossing a fair coin as equally likely to the event "tails." Yet, experimental psychologists such as Malcolm Preston and Philip Baratta (1948) , Richard Griffith (1949) and Ward Edwards (1953 Edwards ( , 1954a Edwards ( , 1954b had shown that in fact individuals do distort objective probabilities, even simple ones. In designing their experiment, Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel took account of this problem and contrived a cunning device to overcome it.
The second reason to focus on the two experiments is sociological in nature. In the 1940s and 1950s, and in fact until recent times, economists typically lacked the expertise to perform experimental research. Therefore economic experiments were often carried out by experimental psychologists and occasionally by other non-economists. This was also the case with our two experiments, and the paper reconstructs how their authors, who were not economists, became interested in measuring an archetypal economic object such as the utility of money using a theory of decision making that was cultivated chiefly by economists. As we will see, the relationship between economists and psychologists did not fit a simple model of division of labor, in which the economists supplied the theory and the psychologists provided the experimental technology. The psychologists actively contributed to identifying and also eliminating the "disturbing causes" that could spoil the significance of the experimental measurements of utility.
Third, the limited influence of the two experiments on economics during the late 1950s and 1960s shows, among other things, that in that period economists were not interested in integrating into decision theory the psychological insights contained in the experiments. To do so would clearly have been a difficult task, and since the two experiments suggested that EUT performed pretty well as a predictor of choice under risk, it could be set aside as nonurgent. Only in the 1970s, when robust experimental evidence against EUT accumulated, were economists compelled to re-consider the psychological phenomena discussed by Mosteller, Nogee, Davidson, Suppes and Siegel.
Setting the Stage

Thurstone's Probabilistic Method of Measuring Sensations
Since the rise of psychometrics in the second half of the nineteenth century, psychologists have tried to measure sensations and intellectual abilities in an experimental way (Michell 1999 ). In the 1920s, the American psychologist Louis Leon Thurstone put forward a probabilistic method of measuring sensations known as the "method of comparative judgment." In Thurstone's approach, a single subject is confronted with pairs of stimuli, e.g. pairs of lights, and asked to compare them with respect to some dimension, e.g. brightness.
Because of judgment errors, distraction, or variation in sensibility, the subject's comparative judgment "is not fixed. It fluctuates" (Thurstone 1927, 274) . As a consequence, when the subject is confronted more than once with the same pair of stimuli A and B, sometimes he will rank A over B, and sometimes B over A. Thurstone used the frequency of the comparative judgments to rank the stimuli: the light that is perceived as brighter more than fifty per cent of the time is taken to be brighter. As we will see, Mosteller and Nogee employed Thurstone's probabilistic approach to give an empirical content to the economic notion of indifference.
Friedman and Wallis' Critique of Thurstone
Since the so-called "marginal revolution" of the 1870s, the economic theory of decisionmaking has been largely based on the concept of utility. However, the fact that utility cannot be observed and measured in a straightforward way ensured that this concept soon became the subject of controversy (Moscati 2013 and 2015a) . In 1930 Thurstone made a foray into economics, performing a pioneering experiment aimed at measuring the indifference curves of an individual (Thurstone 1931 ; for a discussion, Moscati 2007) . In 1942 Milton Friedman and Allen Wallis, the latter a statistician who had studied at Chicago with Friedman, criticized Thurstone because in his study the experimental subject had to choose from fictional rather than actual commodities: "For a satisfactory experiment it is essential that the subject give actual reactions to actual stimuli. […] Questionnaires or other devices based on conjectural responses to hypothetical stimuli do not satisfy this requirement" (Wallis and Friedman 1942, 179-180) . This criticism influenced the design of the Mosteller-Nogee experiment.
Measuring Utility through EUT
A new approach to utility measurement was suggested by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) . They introduced a set of axioms on the individual's preferences that impose, among other things, the following constraints. First, the individual harbors well-defined preferences over all gambles, independently of whether these gambles are simple or complex; accordingly, for any pair of gambles A and B, he either prefers A to B, B to A, or judges them indifferent. Second, the individual must understand correctly the objective probabilities of uncertain events, even complicated ones such as 16.67. Third, he cannot distort objective probabilities by re-interpreting them according to some subjective disposition. Finally, the individual does not obtain utility from the act of gambling, but only from the gamble's payoffs. Von Neumann and Morgenstern proved that an individual satisfying these and other axioms -let us call him an "EUT decision maker" -prefers the gamble associated with the highest expected utility.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern also indicated a handy way in which EUT could be used to measure utility experimentally. If an EUT decision maker is found to be indifferent between, say, a gamble yielding $500 with probability 0.4 and $1,000 with probability 0.6 -such a gamble can be written as [$500, 0.4; $1,000, 0.6] -and $600 for sure, then we can infer that for him u($600) is equal to 0.4u($500)+0.6u($1,000), where u is the individual's utility function. The EUT axioms also imply that the function u is cardinal in nature, i.e., that it is unique up to linearly increasing transformations, so that only two points of it are arbitrary.
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Thus we can state that u($500)=0 and u($1,000)=1, and establish that for the EUT decision maker u($600)=0.40+0.61=0.6.
Beginning in the mid-1940s, the plausibility of von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms and the validity of EUT became the subject of an intense debate in which Savage (1948, 1952) , Jacob Marschak (1950 Marschak ( , 1951 , Paul Samuelson (1950 Samuelson ( , 1952 , Kenneth Arrow (1951 ), Harry Markowitz (1952 , Armen Alchian (1953 ), Robert Strotz (1953 , Maurice Allais (1953 ), Daniel Ellsberg (1954 and other major economists of the period took part.
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The Mosteller-Nogee experiment played some role in this debate. That u is unique up to linearly increasing transformations means that any utility function u′ obtained by multiplying u by a positive number  and then adding any number , that is, any u′ such that u′=u+, with >0, still represents the individual's preferences. The two arbitrary points of a cardinal function reflect the fact that  and  are arbitrary.
For reviews of the debate on EUT in economics, see Fishburn 1989 , Fishburn and Wakker 1995 , Giocoli 2003 , Mongin 2009 , Heukelom 2014 , Moscati 2015b . Although economists investigated and applied EUT more intensively than scholars in other disciplines, the theory was also discussed and used by One of the early articles in support of EUT was coauthored by Friedman and Savage (1948) . The authors here clarified how EUT can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of gambling and insurance, introduced concepts such as risk aversion that quickly became central to the theory of risky decisions, and suggested how the experimental measures of utility obtained on the basis of EUT could be used to test the validity of EUT. If, to continue the previous numerical example, in a further experiment the EUT decision maker is found to be indifferent between gamble [$10,000, 0.2; $500, 0.8] and $1,000 for sure, then he should also be indifferent between gamble [$10,000, 0.12; $500, 0.88] and $600 for sure. If this is not the case, noted Friedman and Savage, "the supposition that individuals seek to maximize expected utility would be contradicted" (1948, 304) . The strategy suggested by Friedman and Savage to test EUT was promptly implemented by their friend Mosteller.
Friedman, Savage, and the genesis of the Mosteller-Nogee Experiment
Frederick Mosteller (1916 Mosteller ( -2006 Savage and Mosteller quickly became buddies and ended up teaching together an philosophers, psychologists, mathematicians and other non-economists. On the reception of EUT outside economics, see Edwards 1961 , Luce and Suppes 1965 , Erikson and others 2013 , and Heukelom 2014 If the EUT decision maker is indifferent between [$10,000, 0.2; $500, 0.8] and $1,000 for sure, then u($1,000)=0.2u($10,000)+0.8u($500); but u($1,000)=1 and u($500)=0, and therefore u($10,000)=1/0.2=5.
The expected utility of [$10,000, 0.12; $500, 0.88] is 0.125+0.880=0.6, which is exactly the utility of $600 for sure. undergraduate course in algebra and trigonometry at Princeton University (Mosteller 2010 (Girshick, Mosteller and Savage 1946) , a paper designing a metallurgical experiment to find the alloy that maximizes the time to rupture under a given stress (Friedman and Savage 1947), 4 and a book on acceptance sampling (Freeman, Friedman, Mosteller, and Wallis 1948 1948, he co-authored with some Harvard colleagues various papers aimed at measuring visual stimuli and perspective illusions and pain sensations (Bruner, Postman, and Mosteller 1950, Keats, Beecher, and Mosteller 1950 but I don't see where it gets me"), and how to phrase the instructions for the experimental subjects ("One phrase I have considered is 'Try to make as much money as you can'. But this has drawbacks"). 6 Friedman and Savage gave prompt feedback to Mosteller, and supported his experimental project.
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In late February and early March 1948, Mosteller conducted a couple of pilot studies for the experiment, and it is probably at this point that he co-opted into the project Philip Nogee , then a Harvard Ph.D. student in clinical psychology whom Mosteller was supervising. According to Mosteller (2010, 196) 
Mosteller and Nogee's Experiment
Mosteller and Nogee (henceforth MN) presented their article as almost an outgrowth of Friedman and Savage's 1948 paper, and addressed two main questions: whether utility can be measured, at least "in a laboratory situation," and whether utility, if measurable, "can be used to predict behavior" (1951, (371) (372) . I first give an overview of the MN experiment and its main results, and then discuss the tension between the economic and psychological elements of its design. To appreciate that tension, going into some of the experiment's technical details is necessary. 
Overview
MN carried out their experiment at the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard University.
The experimental subjects were ten Harvard undergraduate students and five Massachusetts National Guardsmen. Each had to choose, a number of times, whether to participate in a gamble where they could win or lose small amounts of actual money, or refuse the gamble.
Subjects played with $ 1.00, which they received at the beginning of each experimental session.
The experiment had two parts. In the first, the subjects faced "simple-hands" gambles with the following structure. The experimenters showed a card with five numbers called a "hand,"
as in the game of poker dice, e.g., 66431. The card also indicated an amount of money -call it $M -that a subject would win if, by rolling five dice, he "beat" the displayed "hand," whereby the strength of the hands is calculated as in poker. Thus, for instance, hand 22263
("three of a kind") beats 66431 ("pair"). The amounts of money used by MN ranged from a minimum of 2.5¢ to a maximum of $5.07. If the rolled five dice did not beat the displayed hand, the subject lost 5¢. The subjects were informed about the actual odds for each hand, i.e., about the ratio between the probability of winning over that of losing.
By confronting the experimental subjects with different gambles of this form, MN identified a number of monetary amounts $M and odds o for which the experimental subjects were indifferent between participating or not in the gamble. Based on this information and the assumption that u($0)=0 and u(-5¢)=-1, MN measured the utility that seven amounts of money had for their experimental subjects. In particular, MN identified the amounts of money corresponding to the utility-levels 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, and 101, thus identifying seven points of the utility function for money of each subject. By connecting these seven points by straight lines, they drew an approximate graph of the utility curves for money of the subjects. For instance, Figure 3b of their article, which is reproduced in Figure 1 below, shows the estimated utility curve for money of experimental subject B-IV. Mosteller and Nogee, 1951, 387. In the second part of the experiment, MN used the utility functions elicited in the first part to predict whether the subjects would accept or reject more complicated gambles called "doublet hands." In a doublet-hand situation, subjects were faced with two hands, such as 66431and 22263, the odds of beating only the weaker hand (66431), the odds of beating both hands, and the associated winnings. If, by rolling the five dice, the subject did not beat either of the hands, he lost 5¢.
If the utility function obtained in the first part of the experiment from simple hands could be used to predict the subjects' choices over doublet hands, then EUT and the utility measurements based on it would be validated.
Findings
In the first part of their experiment, MN were able to elicit the utility curves for money of all but one of the experimental subjects. 10 MN's first conclusion was therefore that "it is feasible to measure utility experimentally" (403). In particular, MN found that while the Harvard students tended to have concave utility curves for money, i.e. to be risk adverse, the Massachusetts National Guardsmen tended to have convex utility curves for money, i.e. to be risk seeking.
The findings of the second part of the experiment were less clear-cut but, nevertheless, MN assessed them in a favorable way: predictions of choice behavior over doublet hands based on simple hands "are not so good as might be hoped, but their general direction is correct" (399).
Thus, MN concluded that "the notion that people behave in such a way as to maximize their expected utility is not unreasonable."
Design
Many elements in the design of the MN experiment rely on the economic image of human agency embodied in the EUT decision maker. I begin discussing these elements (items i-v), and then move to the parts of the experimental design that were shaped by psychological considerations (items vi-vii).
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The outlier was a Harvard undergraduate whose behavior was "so erratic that no utility curve at all could be found for him" (Mosteller and Nogee, 1951, 385) . i) Real Money. In the psychometric experiments carried out by psychologists, subjects had to respond to stimuli, e.g. had to say which light they perceived as brighter, but did not receive any reward or penalty depending on their responses. In contrast, MN introduced actual monetary rewards into their experiment, and devoted part of their article to arguing that these rewards represented nontrivial incentives for their subjects (376, (402) (403) Preston and Philip Baratta (1948) and Richard Griffith (1949) suggested that bettors harbor "psychological probabilities" that do not coincide with the corresponding mathematical probabilities. In particular, these studies indicated that bettors overvalue low mathematical probabilities and underestimate high ones. Around the same time, the idea of a subjective approach to probability was promoted by the rediscovery of Frank Ramsey's essay "Truth and Probability" ([1926] 1950) .
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The issue of whether monetary incentives are really necessary to motivate experimental subjects is still a subject of controversy between economists, who typically argue that monetary incentives are indeed necessary, and psychologists, who generally do not think so. For recent discussions, see Guala 2005, and Fréchette and Schotter 2015. Although MN cited Ramsey a number of times, and discussed at length the issue of whether subjective (or psychological) and objective (or mathematical) probabilities coincide, their experimental design is based on objective probabilities only and, therefore, on the implicit assumption that experimental subjects do not distort objective probabilities.
iii) Complicated Probabilities. MN presented their experimental subjects with gambles having quite complicated odds. The winning odds for the simple hands the subjects faced in the first part of the experiment were: 1:0.50, 1:1.01, 1:2.01, 1:5.00, 1:10.17, 1:20.24, and 1:101.32.
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The winning odds for the doublet hands used in the second part of the experiment were even more complicated. Although for an EUT decision maker all probability figures are equally comprehensible, from a psychological viewpoint it is natural to argue that subjects may find it hard to understand odds and probability figures like those used by MN. iv) Gamble vs. Sure Outcome. In the MN experiment subjects had to choose between a proper gamble, in which they could win $M or lose 5¢, and the sure outcome associated with the refusal of gambling. In the EUT framework there is no difference between gamble-vs-gamble choices and gamble-vs-sure-outcome choices because EUT rules out the existence of a specific utility or disutility deriving from the very act of gambling. However, if such specific utility for gambling exists -as seems plausible from a psychological viewpoint -such utility would distort utility measures like those obtained by MN. A positive utility for gambling would in fact lead to overestimation of the utility of sure amounts of money, while a negative utility for gambling would have the opposite effect.
These winning odds correspond, respectively, to winning probabilities 66. 67, 49.75, 33.22, 16.67, 8.95, 4.71, and 0.98. v) Different Types of Gambles. MN used the utility measures elicited from choices involving simple hands to predict choices involving doublet hands, which were much more complex.
Again, from the economic viewpoint this is perfectly legitimate because an EUT decision maker displays well-defined preferences over all gambles, independently of whether these gambles are simple or complex. From a psychological standpoint, however, using utility measures elicited from simple gambles to predict choices over complex gambles may appear questionable.
Although the above elements of the MN experimental design rely on the image of human agency associated with EUT, other elements suggest a sensitivity to psychological considerations that EUT rules out. 
Summing Up
Mosteller and Nogee were, respectively, a statistician turned experimental psychologist and a psychologist. Nevertheless, the design of their experiment owes much to the economic image of human agency. Some elements of their design -such as the idea of having experimental subjects adjust amounts of money rather than probabilities, or the probabilistic approach to indifference -do rely on psychological insights, but many other elements are tailored to the EUT decision maker. In particular, the MN design rules out the possibility that actual individuals may distort objective probabilities, misunderstand complicated odds, derive utility from the very act of gambling, or behave differently when faced with different types of gambles. The fact that in the MN design the tension between the economic understanding of human agency associated with EUT and the psychological insights conflicting with it is resolved very much in favor of the former appears to reflect Friedman's and Savage's influence on Mosteller.
The Rise of EUT, 1950-1954
In 1950 EUT was still only one among many theories of decision under risk on the economists' table (Arrow 1951) ; but from the early 1950s its fortunes rapidly improved. dominant status of EUT in economics. Building on Ramsey's subjective approach to probability, Savage showed how to extend EUT to the case in which the probabilities of uncertain outcomes are not objectively given but express the decision maker's subjective beliefs about the likelihood of the outcomes.
The MN experiment played some role in the rise of EUT. Between 1952 and advocates of EUT argued that the experiment provided reliable empirical support to the theory (Friedman and Savage 1952 , Markowitz 1952 , Alchian 1953 , Strotz 1953 , Marschak 1954 , Savage 1954 . Critics of EUT, by contrast, claimed that the MN results were inconclusive or hardly extensible to more realistic situations (Manne 1952 , Allais 1953 , Ellsberg 1954 . At any rate, the MN experiment showed that EUT has clear empirical implications, can be used to make predictions, and can therefore be falsified by experimental findings. This was not the case for other theories of decision under risk such as Allais'. More importantly, even if inconclusive or hardly extensible to more realistic situations, the results of the MN experiment failed to contradict EUT. Therefore, supporters of the theory such as Friedman and Savage (1952, 466) could claim that the experiment justified some "mild optimism" about the validity of EUT.
The rise of EUT as the mainstream economic model for risky choices in the early 1950s explains why Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (henceforth DSS), when they entered the economics of decision-making from their home disciplines, focused on EUT rather than other theories of choice under risk. But before we turn to DSS and outline how they embarked on the experimental measurement of utility, a further contextual element should be mentioned.
As illustrated in section 3.3, Mosteller and Nogee had discussed the possibility that subjective and objective probabilities may not coincide. Ward Edwards, another of Mosteller's Ph.D. students in psychology at Harvard, investigated the issue further (on Edwards, see Shanteau, Mellers, and Schum 1999) . In his doctoral dissertation and a series of papers derived from it, Edwards (1953 Edwards ( , 1954a Edwards ( , 1954b presented experimental results confirming that bettors harbor subjective probabilities that are at odds with objective probabilities. In particular, Edwards (1953, 363) pointed out that this fact "has serious implications for the utility curves of Mosteller and Nogee and indeed for the whole method of utility measurement proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern." In fact, if subjective and objective probabilities are different, and the experimenter has no clue about the former, the expected-utility formula presents two unknowns -the utilities of money and the subjective probabilities -so that it becomes useless for quantifying the utilities of money in terms of probabilities. In designing their experiment, DSS took account of this problem and contrived a cunning device to overcome it.
Suppes, Davidson, Siegel, and the Stanford Value Theory Project
Patrick Suppes (1922 Suppes ( -2014 1953. However, neither had any previous experience in experimental investigation, and they therefore brought Sidney Siegel into the project. Siegel (1916 Siegel ( -1961 , then completing his Ph.D. in psychology at Stanford, had begun his doctoral studies in 1951, at the age of thirtyfive, after having taken a rather singular biographical and educational path (Engvall Siegel 1964) . In the doctoral dissertation he completed in fall 1953, Siegel presented a possible measure of authoritarianism based on experimental techniques (Siegel 1954 Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes (1955) introduced into decision analysis the so-called "money pump argument", which shows that an individual with intransitive preferences can be exploited and induced to pay money for nothing. Suppes and his doctoral student Muriel Winet (1956) put forward an axiomatization of cardinal utility based on the notion of utility differences. Davidson and Suppes (1956) developed an axiomatization of subjective EUT in which the set of alternatives over which the individual's preferences are defined is not infinite, as it is in the Ramsey-Savage framework, but finite. DSS conducted their experiment to measure the utility of money in spring 1954; their experimental subjects were nineteen male students hired through the Stanford University Student Employment Service.
DSS first presented their experimental results in a Stanford
Value Theory Project report published in August 1955 (Davidson, Siegel, and Suppes 1955) , and two years later in the book Decision Making: An Experimental Approach (1957) . As Ellsberg (1958 Ellsberg ( , 1009 noticed in reviewing the book, it is not so much a systematic introduction to decision making as "a long article, dealing fairly technically with problems connected with this particular set of experiments."
On the cover of the book, the work is presented as co-authored by Davidson and Suppes " in collaboration with Sidney Siegel," who, meanwhile had moved to Pennsylvania State University. In practice it is difficult to disentangle the individual contributions to the experiment, and therefore in the following I will consider it as a joint product.
The Davidson-Suppes-Siegel experiment
The primary aim of DSS was "to develop a psychometric technique for measuring utility" in an interval scale, i.e., in a cardinal way, within the expected-utility framework (1957, 25) . In particular, they were "originally inspired by the desire to see whether it was possible to improve on the Mosteller and Nogee's results" (20) . This involved seven students in music at Stanford University, and aimed at measuring their utility for LP records of classical music on the basis of their choices between gambles having the records as prizes. The significance of this experiment, however, was marred by the high number of intransitive choices observed by Suppes and Davidson. The intransitives, which were probably due to the fact that most students perceived the LP records as too similar, made it tricky to identify even ordinal utility functions for the records. See Davidson and Suppes, 1956; and Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel 1957, 84-103. As already mentioned, the general structure of the MN and DSS experiments is analogous.
However, DDS modified a number of the elements of the MN design in order to make the decision tasks faced by their experimental subjects psychologically more friendly than the tasks faced by the MN subjects. However, and unlike the majority of current behavioral economists, DSS did not exploit their psychological insights to argue that the standard economic theory of decision making was flawed. Rather, they used psychological considerations to avoid confusions or biases in their subjects, thereby generating utility measures as similar as possible to those that would have been obtained if the choices had been made by EUT decision makers. To understand how DSS managed to do this, we have to enter into the technical details of their experimental design.
Design
i) Real Money. Like MN, DSS used real monetary payoffs. At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects received $2.00 to gamble, and the gambles' payoffs ranged from -35¢ to +50¢ (fractions of cents were not allowed). The use of real money was motivated by philosophical preoccupations very much in accord with the sort of preoccupations expressed by Friedman and Wallis in their critique of Thurstone's experiment. DSS (1957, 7) in fact followed the behaviorist approach to human agency advocated by Bertrand Russell (1921) and Ramsey ([1926 Ramsey ([ ] 1950 , downplaying the relevance of introspection for decision analysis, and arguing that "it is with actual decision-making behavior that decision theory is concerned." Accordingly, DSS required that the decisions made in the experimental situation were "real in the most importance sense," that is, they required that the announcement of preferences between gambles made by a subjected was "followed by […] paying the subject (or collecting from him) the appropriate amount of money" (6-7).
ii) Subjective Probabilities. While the MN experiment was based on objective probabilities, DSS explicitly advocated a subjective approach to probability, and followed the RamseySavage subjective version of EUT. Accordingly, they considered gambles of the form "x cents of dollar if event E occurs, -y cents of dollars if event E does not occur" -for brevity, [x¢, E; -y¢, not-E] -whereby each subject was supposed to assign his subjective probabilities Π(E) and Π(not-E) to the two events. As explained in section 4, however, if subjective probabilities are unknown, the expected-utility formula cannot be used to measure the utility of money.
DSS cited the articles by Preston-Baratta and Edwards showing that individuals often
distort objective probabilities, and therefore were well aware that the problem could not be solved by choosing events with apparently straightforward objective probabilities, such as "heads" or "tails" in tossing a coin. Moreover, in the pilots of their experiment, DSS (1957, 51) found that their subjects often preferred gamble [x¢, heads; -x¢, tails] to gamble [-x¢, heads; x¢, tails], so showing that they considered "heads" more probable than "tails." DSS eventually solved the problem by constructing special dice carrying a nonsense syllable, such as ZOJ, on three faces, and another nonsense syllable, such as ZEJ, on the other three faces.
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If we indicate as ZOJ the event that "the syllable ZOJ comes up when tossing a die," and as ZEJ the event that "the syllable ZEJ comes up," DSS found that their experimental subjects were indifferent between [x¢, ZOJ; -x¢, ZEJ] and [-x¢, ZOJ; x¢, ZEJ], so showing that they actually believed that the mutually exclusive events ZOJ and ZEJ were equally likely, that is, that Π(ZOJ)= Π(ZEJ)=0.5.
According to Alberta Engvall Siegel (1964, 9 ), Siegel's second wife, it was Siegel who came up with the idea of the ZOJ-ZEJ dice: "A central problem [in the DSS experiment] was identifying an event which had subjective probability .50 for the subject, and Sid devised a zero-association nonsense-syllable die to serve as this event." I have found no evidence confirming or disconfirming this claim. In their autobiographies, Davidson (1999) and Suppes (1979) tend to downplay Siegel's role in the experiment (Davidson does not even mention Siegel), but do not discuss the paternity of the ZOJ-ZEJ dice.
iii) Simple probabilities. In using the ZEJ and ZOJ events, DSS not only solved the problem associated with the identification of subjective probabilities, but also avoided the psychologically tricky odds the MN subjects were presented with. If experimental subjects understand fifty-fifty gambles better than gambles with more complex odds, then the utility measures obtained from choices over ZOJ-ZEJ gambles are more reliable than the measures obtained from choices over the simple and doublets hands used by MN. iv) Gamble vs. Gamble. In the MN experiment, subjects had to choose between a proper gamble and a sure amount of money corresponding to the status quo. DSS (1957, 23) stressed that, if gambling itself has a negative or positive utility for the subject, this approach "would produce the maximum distortion" in the utility measures.
In order to overcome this problem, in all decision situations but one DSS had their experimental subjects choose between two proper gambles of the form [x¢, ZOJ; -y¢, ZEJ].
In this way, the psychologically plausible utilities for gambling associated with the two bets should cancel out, and therefore the utility measures obtained in the gamble-vs-gamble situation should be more precise than those obtained in the gamble-vs-sure-outcome situation considered by MN. v) Same Type of Gambles. DSS ran a second session of the experiment to check the utility measures obtained in the first session. While MN performed this test by using the utility functions elicited from choices involving simple hands to predict choices involving doublet hands, DSS considered choices over the same type of gambles. Specifically, DSS ran a second experimental session that took place at some period -varying from a few days to several weeks -after the first one. In this second session they re-elicited the utility curves for money of their experimental subjects from choices between [x¢, ZOJ; -y¢, ZEJ] gambles analogous to those used in the first session. Finally, DSS checked whether the utility curves elicited in the second experimental session were like those elicited in the first. vi) Understating Money. In the DSS experiment, the payoffs of all gambles had the same probability, namely 0.5. Accordingly, the identification of indifferent gambles was necessarily based on modification of the monetary payoff at stake in the gambles. In this respect, the DSS experiment was similar to the MN one. In particular, DSS (7-9) ruled out fractions of cents, which are knotty from a psychological viewpoint, and considered only payoffs consisting of integer amounts of cents. and g only by approximation, and therefore were only able to elicit the bounds of the subjects' utility curves rather than the utility curves themselves. 
Findings
In the first part of their experiment, DSS managed to elicit the bounds of the utility curves of fifteen of their nineteen experimental subjects. The subjects' utility curves were presented in graphs like the one reproduced in Figure 2 below, which refers to Subject 1. Davidson, Siegel and Suppes 1957, 63. 18 For instance, DDS found that, for Subject 1, the sum c corresponding to utility level -3 lies between -11¢ and -10¢; the sum d corresponding to utility level +3 lies between 11¢ and 12¢; the sum f corresponding to utility level -5 lies between -18¢ and -15¢; and the sum g corresponding to utility level +5 lies between 14¢ and 18¢.
Regarding the fifteen subjects for whom it was possible to elicit utility curves, the main experimental findings obtained by DSS (1957, 62-72) can be summarized as follows:
i)
The utility curves of ten subjects displayed a trend similar to the curve of Subject 1's, i.e., convex for wins (love for risk) and concave for losses (risk aversion);
ii) The utility curves of two subjects displayed the opposite trend: they were concave for wins and convex for losses;
iii) The utility curves of the remaining three subjects were fundamentally linear through their length, suggesting that they were risk neutral.
DSS compared these findings with those obtained by MN from choices over simple hands and argued that, despite the differences between the two experiments, the degree of similarity between their results was "fairly striking" (75).
In the second session of the experiment, DSS re-elicited the utility curves of ten of the original fifteen experimental subjects, and found that, for nine of the ten subjects, the utility curves elicited in the two sessions were in fact very similar.
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Thus, like MN, DSS concluded their experimental study in an optimistic way, i.e., by arguing that measuring utility experimentally appears feasible:
The chief experimental result may be interpreted as showing that for some individuals and under appropriate circumstances it is possible to measure utility in an interval scale [i.e., in a cardinal way]
This result, in turn, supported the thesis that "an individual makes choices among alternatives involving risk as if he were trying to maximize expected utility" (26).
For DSS (1957, 69 ) the behavior of the remaining subject was explained by the fact that he was a foreign student with some language difficulty.
Summing Up
In designing their experiment, DSS took into account a number of psychological phenomena that MN had neglected, such as the fact that actual individuals may distort objective probabilities or get confused when facing gambles with complicated odds. If considered from the viewpoint of EUT, these phenomena may be seen as "disturbing causes" that jeopardize the validity of the theory and spoil the significance of the experimental measurements of utility. The very fact of discussing these psychological phenomena in a book addressed not only to psychologists but also, and primarily, to economists was certainly pioneering.
However, DSS took those aspects of the psychology of decision making into account mostly in order to neutralize them. One may say that they took into consideration the psychology of decision only to have their experimental subjects behave like brave EUT decision makers. It is not therefore very surprising that DSS concluded that utility is measurable and EUT validated.
Influence in Economics
In the economic literature of the decade 1955-1965, the MN and DSS experiments were cited in connection with issues concerning the measurability of utility and the probabilistic theory of choice. However, their overall impact on the economic analysis of the period was limited.
The most comprehensive discussion of the significance of the utility measurements carried out by MN and DSS can be found in Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa's Games and Decisions, a book that after its publication in 1957 quickly became a key reference point for economists working in decision analysis. Luce and Raiffa (1957, 35) summarized the methods used by MN and DSS to measure utility, praised the DSS experiment as "the most elegant in the area," but pointed out that the MN and DSS utility measures do not appear replicable or applicable outside the laboratory. Despite this limitation, which today we would call an "external validity problem," Luce and Raiffa argued that laboratory attempts to measure utility are worth undertaking in order "to see if under any conditions, however limited, the postulates of the model can be confirmed" (37).
Other commentators, such as Ellsberg (1958) and Arrow (1958) , made a similar externalvalidity point: the utility measurements carried out by MN and DSS appeared hardly extendable to situations different to the very specific ones designed by MN or DSS, e.g., to
situations involving larger amounts of money.
Suppes was well aware of this issue. In a paper presented at a conference on game theory held in Princeton in 1961, he acknowledged that experimental studies of utility measurement were as "yet entirely too fragile in relation to the massive claims sometimes made for utility theory" (1962, 62) . In particular, he stressed the necessity of measuring utility in situations in which individuals "are making weighty and significant decisions" (62). Suppes even predicted that operations-research people in government and industry were on the verge of undertaking these kind of studies.
This prediction, however, was not fulfilled. In the 1960s economists lost interest in the experimental measurement of utility. Apparently, in that decade only Marschak, in collaboration with psychologist Gordon M. Becker and statistician Morris H. DeGroot, made a further attempt to measure experimentally the utility of money (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak 1964) . However, at that point of his career Marschak was far from being a typical economist (Herfeld, this volume). Since the mid-1950s his research interests had moved away from traditional mathematical economics towards psychology and, more generally, the behavioral sciences. Indeed, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak article was not published in an economics journal but in the interdisciplinary review Behavioral Science.
Marschak and associates presented their experiment as an evolution of the MN experiment and did not cite DSS. In particular, like MN and differently from DSS, Becker, DeGroot and Marschak assumed that the two Yale students who were their experimental subjects understood well, and did not distort, objective probabilities. Marschak and associates asked the students to state their minimum selling prices for wagers the payoffs of which ranged from 0¢ to +100¢ and, based on EUT, used the selling prices to elicit the students' utility curves for money. The authors concluded that, as the students became more familiar with the experimental task, they behaved more consistently with the EUT model.
More than in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak study, the psychological insights embodied in the MN and DSS experiments found application in the probabilistic theory of choice, which was advanced in the mid-1950s by Marschak (again) and other economists. The theory is based on a Thurstonian definition of preference -a subject prefers alternative A to alternative B if the probability that he chooses A over B is at least one-half -and its proponents often referred to MN's definition of indifference as a pioneering use of the probabilistic approach in economics (Marschak 1955 , Quandt 1956 , Debreu 1958 , Luce 1959 . In association with
Davidson (Davidson and Marschak 1959) , as well as with Becker and DeGroot (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak 1963) , Marschak also ran experiments to test the probabilistic theory of choice. In order to circumvent subjective distortions of objective probabilities, he and his coauthors used the ZOJ-ZEJ dice introduced by DSS. However, by the mid-1960s the probabilistic approach to choice was substantially abandoned in economics, possibly because its implications for demand and equilibrium analysis were unclear.
With the vanishing of the economists' interest in both the probabilistic theory of choice and the experimental measurement of utility, the psychological phenomena discussed by MN and DSS disappeared from the purview of the mainstream economic theory of decision.
Integrating them into decision theory would clearly have been a difficult task, and since the MN, DSS and even the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak experiments suggested that EUT was an acceptable predictor of choice under risk, the difficult task could be set aside as non-urgent.
It was only in the 1970s, when robust experimental evidence against EUT accumulated and theories alternative to EUT began to be advanced, that the psychology of decision re-gained importance for economists. Thus it does not appear merely accidental that, in the celebrated article in which Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979, 276) put forward their Prospect Theory, they cited the MN and DSS experiments.
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For Kahneman, Tversky, and other non-EUT theorists, however, psychological phenomena such as those discussed by MN and DSS ceased to be disturbing causes to be removed, and become fundamental causes to be investigated.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has explored a part of the interdisciplinary interaction between economics and psychology in the 1940s and 1950s by studying the origin, content and impact of two experiments to measure the utility of money. Both experiments were performed by psychologists and other non-economists, and their design contained a number of elements that responded to psychological insights rather than the economic image of human agency associated with EUT. Between 1955 and 1965, these psychological insights found some application in the short-lived theory of probabilistic choice, but were quickly forgotten afterwards.
The story told in this paper, therefore, can be framed as an actual encounter between economics and psychology or, more specifically, between the mainstream economic theory of was economics compelled to re-consider its relationship with psychology and the psychological phenomena discussed by Mosteller, Nogee, Davidson, Suppes and Siegel. 
